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Article 17

Processing presupposition: Verifying sentences with ‘only’
Abstract
With respect to how comprehenders process presupposition and handle presupposition failure when
verifying sentences, at least two hypotheses are possible: (1) presuppositions are treated like
preconditions for evaluating the truth or falsity of a sentence, and are systematically verified before the
assertion, and (2) presuppositions are 'backgrounded' and therefore taken for granted—meaning that
assertions are systematically evaluated first. Three sentence-picture verification experiments are
presented which suggest some version of the latter view; the results are compatible with there being no
explicit step of presupposition verification. Instead, presupposition failure arises only accidentally, or in
cases where the content of the presupposition is made especially salient in the discourse context by
some external means.

This conference paper is available in University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics:
https://repository.upenn.edu/pwpl/vol14/iss1/17

Processing Presupposition: Verifying Sentences with ‘Only’
Christina Kim*
1 Introduction
1.1 Presuppositions and Sentence Verification
This paper is about presuppositions and how the information they contain is
used by comprehenders to understand what a sentence means in a given
context. In particular, I am interested in how presuppositions differ from
assertions in how their content is processed procedurally. But let us start
with the more basic question of why presuppositions are special to begin
with. Why might we even expect that presuppositions would behave any
differently from assertions, scalar implicatures, etc. in a behavioral task?
One answer to this is that presuppositions appear to have a special
discourse status—they’re characteristically backgrounded information with
respect to the main assertion of a sentence, which is foregrounded or ‘under
discussion’. Say presuppositions are noncontroversial, to borrow Stalnaker’s
language—to put it now in terms of ‘speaker presuppositions’, a
presupposition is material conveyed by a sentence that the speaker feels she
can safely assume is already part of the common ground (or if it’s not, is
something that interlocutors won’t take issue with—that is, it won’t be a
problem to accommodate that information or otherwise treat it as if it had
already been in the common ground) (Stalnaker 1978, 2002, Simons 2002).
The current study looks at this aspect of presuppositions from the point of
view of processing; specifically it looks at the procedures people use to
evaluate the truth or falsity of a sentence in some context, and asks where
presupposition verification fits into such procedures.1
With respect to what people do procedurally when they understand a
sentence with a presupposition, we can identify (at least) the following two
*Thanks to Daniel Büring, Philippe Schlenker, Christine Gunlogson, Martin

Hackl, Jason Kandybowicz, and Colin Wilson for helpful discussions and comments,
or for at least patiently listening to me talk about this material when it was in varying
stages of unpreparedness.
1
There’s also the projection behavior of presuppositions—that is, how the
presuppositions of a complex sentence are related to the presuppositions of its
subparts; this paper doesn’t say anything about the projection problem, but cf.
Chemla and Schlenker (2006), who start with different pairings of presupposition
triggers and quantificational environments, and ask whether inferences predicted by
various projection theories actually arise.
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states of affairs. First, it might be that presuppositions must be verified as a
precondition for evaluating the truth/falsity of a sentence—in other words,
you can’t compute a truth value unless all presuppositions have been
verified. This is a kind of direct implementation of a Heim-style update
model, or any logical system that will output ‘#’ or truth-value gaps in case
of presupposition failure. I’ll refer to this as the ‘Preconditions’ hypothesis.
In contrast, according to an ‘Assertion-first’ hypothesis, the backgrounded
status of presuppositions leads comprehenders to simply take it for granted
that they are satisfied in the context, without bothering to verify it, instead
giving priority to the main assertion.
The current study looks at verification procedures to pull apart the
predictions of these two hypotheses.2 Sentence-picture verification will give
us data that bears on the issue of how presuppositions are (i) treated by
comprehenders for the purpose of understanding the (truth-conditional)
meaning of a sentence, and (ii) relatedly, how they differ from assertions in
terms of representation in a mental discourse model. On the basis of three
experiments, I’ll argue for the following view of presuppositions and how
they are processed: presuppositions are treated as backgrounded information
and therefore simply assumed to be satisfied in the evaluation context. This
means that when nothing else in the preceding discourse or the evaluation
context independently makes the content of presuppositions salient,
comprehenders can initially miss violated presuppositions. On the other
hand, things that affect discourse salience or otherwise increase salience in
the (visual) context will strongly influence how likely comprehenders are to
notice cases of presupposition failure. While the results of Experiment 1
somewhat misleadingly suggest that comprehenders use presupposition
violations immediately to reject a sentence (implying that presuppositions
are verified first), Experiments 2 and 3 reveal that such situations only arise
in case the content of the presupposition is made extra salient in the
discourse context—that is, there is no requirement that comprehenders verify

2

Note that most if not all semantic theories of presupposition make no claim
about the actual strategies people use when they are producing and understanding
sentences. Even in dynamic approaches (Heim’s context-change model; Kamp’s
DRT, Veltman, Zeevat, Beaver update models), where there seems to be a claim
about procedure—that is, there’s a sequence of steps executed in order for the context
to finally be updated with the information in a sentence—these models stop short of
claiming that such procedures are adopted by people as a comprehension strategy. To
take a simple example, suppose that presuppositions are defined in the theory as
definedness conditions on context updates (as in Heim); actual comprehenders might
simply assume without verification that presuppositions are satisfied, simply because
to do otherwise would yield infelicity and be totally unproductive/uninformative (cf.
von Fintel 2006).
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presuppositions before evaluating the main assertion of a sentence. In fact, it
will turn out that in some cases, comprehenders simply take presuppositions
for granted, and only very late realize that these unverified assumptions are
incompatible with information in the context.
1.2 Sentence-Picture Verification
To ask these questions we’re going to have people evaluate the truth or
falsity of sentences of different types, given an evaluation context (a
picture). The basic idea behind this paradigm is that for each kind of
sentence (really, each kind of determiner), we know what information the
comprehender needs from the visual display in order to decide whether the
sentence is true or false; from that, we can make some basic assumptions
about how comprehenders will search a visual display for the relevant
information. When visual search procedures differ with different sentence
types, we assume that these different strategies will be reflected in different
reaction times (RTs). We can then use subjects’ RT data to infer what
verification procedure they are using for some sentence type.
For instance, consider what it would take to verify or falsify the
sentence in (1), given the picture in Fig. 1 as evaluation context.
(1) Every kid has an umbrella.
You’d have to go through the set of individuals in the picture, checking for
each one whether (s)he has an umbrella. Because the search is
sequential/serial in nature, we expect sentences of this type (with universal
quantification) to have relatively slow response times. Further, we expect a
True/False asymmetry: False cases will be faster than True cases, since you
can falsify the sentence and terminate the trial upon finding just one falsifier,
while a picture that makes the sentence true will contain no falsifiers, and
therefore require exhausting the entire search space without finding one.
Now consider (2). The corresponding picture would be much like Fig. 1,
except that one of the boys would have the name ‘Dave’ printed on his tshirt.
(2) Dave has an umbrella.
The procedure for verifying or falsifying this sentence is very different from
the ‘Every’ case: all you have to do is find the person named in the sentence,
and check whether or not he has an umbrella. Responding to such a sentence
will take just as long as it takes to find the relevant individual in the
picture—that is, we expect fast RTs relative to the ‘Every’ conditions. In
addition, no True/False asymmetry of the type described above is expected.
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Fig. 1: Picture for ‘Every kid has an umbrella’ (false)
Against the two verification strategies just described, now consider
sentence (3). For now, assume that (3) asserts (4a), and presupposes (4b).
(3) Only Dave has an umbrella.
(4) a. No one other than Dave has an umbrella.
b. Dave has an umbrella.
The two hypotheses outlined above for how presuppositions are evaluated
with respect to assertions make different predictions for ‘Only’ sentences.
On the one hand, if presuppositions are like preconditions for computing
sentence meanings, then presupposition verification will be the first thing to
happen, and conditions where the presupposition of ‘only’ is not satisfied
(Dave doesn’t have an umbrella) will be rejected very quickly, much like the
Name conditions. But if comprehenders take presuppositions for granted and
don’t bother verifying them, they’ll start by evaluating the assertion (whether
anyone other than Dave has an umbrella), and may only discover afterward
that their assumptions are at odds with the visual context (Dave doesn’t have
an umbrella). In this case responses would be expected to be slow, like the
‘Every’ conditions (since the assertive component of an ‘only’ sentence is
also a universal statement).
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2 Experiment 1: ‘Only’ and Proper Names
Experiment 1 tests the three sentence types mentioned above
(Every/Name/Only) in a sentence-picture verification task. Under the
assumption that a universal statement (e.g. ‘Every’ and the assertive
component of ‘Only’) requires serial search through the visual display, and
should therefore take longer than statements about individuals (e.g. the
‘Name’ condition and the presupposition component of ‘Only’), reactions
times to the Only-Presupposition failure conditions should indicate whether
presupposition verification happens before evaluation of the assertion (fast
RTs), or after (slow RTs).
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Materials/Design
Sentence type (Every/Name/Only) was crossed with Truth value
(True/False), with an additional Presupposition failure condition for ‘Only’,
making a total of seven experimental conditions. Each item consisted of a
sentence-picture pair; example sentences and picture descriptions are given
in Table 1.

Every
Every boy has a
book

TRUE

FALSE

8 boys, each with a
book

4 boys with books; 4
with non-books

Mark with book; 7 Mark with a non-book;
Proper name
Mark has a book boys with either
7 boys with either books
Sentence
books or non-books or non-books
type
7 boys with non4 boys with books; 3
books; Mark with
with non-books; Mark
Only
with book
Only Mark has a book
book
Presupposition failure:
7 boys with non-books; Mark with non-book
Table 1: Example sentence-picture pairs for Experiment 1
Picture scenes always displayed eight individuals evenly spaced out on the
screen, and were created by Photoshopping together images from verbal
competence tests (Curtiss and Yamada 2004, Dunn and Dunn 1997).
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Three fixed order lists were created (items were not presented randomly
in order to avoid accidentally presenting adjacent items with overlapping
lexical items and/or names). Each subject saw 8 items from each condition,
making a total of 56 experimental items per session.
2.1.2 Procedure
26 native speakers of North American English (UCLA undergraduates)
participated in the experiment.
Stimuli were presented on a Macintosh computer running PsyScope
(Cohen et al. 1993). Each trial proceeded as follows: first, a sentence
appeared in the center of the computer screen. After reading the sentence,
subjects pressed a button, which would bring up a picture. The subject’s task
was to respond (by button press) ‘Yes’ if the sentence accurately described
the picture, and ‘No’ if it did not. The dependent measure was the RT to the
picture (i.e. the duration from the first button press to the second button
press). Each session took approximately 15-20 minutes.

Fig. 2: Experiment 1: Mean RT by condition
(error bars are Standard Error)
2.2 Results
There were main effects of both Sentence type (F1(2,19)=44.0, p<.0001;
F2(2,39)=43.3, p<.0001) and Truth value (F1(1,19)=55.3, p<.0001;
F2(1,39)=54.5, p<.0001), and a Sentence type-Truth value interaction
(F1(2,19)=20.3, p<.0001; F2(2,39)=20.2, p<.0001)); Figure 2 shows mean
reaction times by condition.
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As expected, True conditions took longer than False conditions for
‘Every’ (t=3.6, p<.005)3, but not for ‘Name’ sentences (t=.5, p<1.0),
suggesting that the RT measure is sensitive enough to pick up differences in
verification procedures. Looking at the three ‘Only’ conditions, the OnlyTrue condition took longer than both Only-False (t=8.0, p<.0001) and OnlyPresupposition failure (t=8.8, p<.0001); Only-False did not differ from the
Only-Presupposition failure condition (t=1.3, p<.6), or from the Name-True
(t=2.3, p<.2) and Name-False (t=1.7, p<.4) conditions. In addition, subjects
took much longer to respond to Only-True sentences than to Every-True
sentences (t=5.4, p<.0001).
2.3 Discussion
The fact that the Presupposition failure condition is fast, like the Name
conditions and unlike the Only-True condition, looks like support for the
‘Preconditions’ hypothesis: people are fast to reject cases of presupposition
failure because presupposition verification precedes verifying the assertion
(and since the presupposition is not satisfied in the picture, it is immediately
rejected as being incompatible with the sentence).
There are reasons to be skeptical of this interpretation, however. For one
thing, there’s a very large RT difference between the Every-True and OnlyTrue conditions—note that these are both universal statements that turn out
true. There are only two obvious potential sources of this difference: (1) the
assertive component of ‘only’ contains an extra negation (‘for all x, it’s not
the case that x has some property’) that isn’t present in the case of ‘every’,
and (2) ‘only’ possibly has this extra step of presupposition verification. But
if either or both of these differences is the source of the Every-True vs.
Only-True difference, the following additional data are mysterious: first, if
the extra negation in the ‘only’ sentences is adding to the response times,
Only-False should also take longer than Only-Presupposition failure, which
it doesn’t. Second, if the extra presupposition verification step were the
source of the RT difference, Only-False should take longer than Every-False,
which it doesn’t (t=1.7, p<.5). We’ll leave this as a puzzle for now, but
return to it in Experiment 3.
There is a more basic problem with Experiment 1, which is that the
‘Only’ conditions involved proper names: after seeing a sentence like ‘Only
Dave has an umbrella’, suppose the reason subjects attended immediately to
the individual labeled ‘Dave’ in the picture is that that individual has just
been named, likely bumping up the salience of both the name and the
designated individual (note also that the visual presence of the label in the

3

P-values are adjusted throughout for multiple comparisons, where appropriate.
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picture probably also contributes to its visual salience). If this is what is
going on, the fact that presupposition failure is noticed immediately is
simply an artifact of stimulus design—the proper name just happens to bring
into attentional focus exactly that part of the picture that tells you that the
presupposition is violated. To fix this confound, Experiment 2 uses definite
descriptions instead of names, with the intention of making it harder to
immediately identify the relevant set of individuals in the display.

3 Experiment 2: ‘Only’ and Definite Descriptions
3.1 Methods
There were 8 experimental conditions, created by crossing Sentence type
(Every/Def/Only#/OnlyS)4 and Truth value (True/False); examples of
sentences-picture pairs are given in Table 2. The definite description
condition replaces the proper name condition from Experiment 1, and the
‘only’ sentences are split up into two conditions (one where the
presupposition of ‘only’ is not satisfied, and one where it is); Experiment 2 is
otherwise identical in format to Experiment 1. Pictures were adapted from
the set used in Experiment 1.
Subjects saw stimuli from one of four lists. There were a total of 64
experimental trials per session. 40 UCLA undergraduates participated in the
experiment.
TRUE
Sentence Every
Every kid has a book
type
Definite description
The girls have books

FALSE

8 boys/girls,
8 boys/girls: 4 with
each with a book books; 4 with nonbooks
2 girls with
books; 6 boys
with either
books or non-

2 girls with nonbooks; 6 boys with
either books or nonbooks

Only—presupp not met 2 girls with non- 2 girls with nonOnly the girls have
books; 6 boys
books; 6 boys with
books
with non-books either books or nonbooks

4

Abbreviations for condition names: Def = Definite descriptions; Only# =
Only/presupposition failure; OnlyS = Only/presupposition satisfied.
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TRUE
Only—presupp satisfied 2 girls with
Only the girls have
books; 6 boys
books
with non-books
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FALSE
2 girls with books;
6 boys with either
books or non-books

Table 2: Example sentence-picture pairs for Experiment 2
3.2 Results
Mean reaction times are shown in Figure 3. As in Experiment 1, there were
main effects of Sentence type (F1(1,32)=130.5, p<.0001; F2(1,37)=130.9,
p<.0001) and Truth value (F1(3,32)=38.7, p<.0001; F2(3,37)=38.8,
p<.0001), and an interaction of Sentence type and Truth value
(F1(3,38)=13.3, p<.0001; F2(3,37)=13.2, p<.0001).

Fig. 3: Experiment 2: Mean RT by condition
Post-hoc comparisons show that True conditions took longer than False
conditions for both sets of Only conditions; differences were only numerical
for Every and Definites. Within the Only conditions, OnlyS replicated the
Experiment 1 results: True sentences took longer than False sentences
(t=10.1, p<.0001). Only# show something different—the True sentences are
slow, relative to both OnlyS-False (t=7.5, p<.0001) and Only#-False (t=7.2,
p<.0001). OnlyS-True and Only#-True did not differ from each other (t=1.5,
p=.4).
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3.3 Discussion
Recall that the two verification steps that are possibly involved in verifying
‘Only’ sentences are (1) verifying the assertion—a negative universal
statement (e.g. No one other than the girls has an umbrella), and (2)
verifying the presupposition—basically identical to the Definite description
case (e.g. The girls have umbrellas). In this experiment, unlike in
Experiment 1, the key condition (Only#-True, where the presupposition is
violated but the assertion is true) was slow relative to both Only-False
conditions. This suggests that the Experiment 1 result did indeed have to do
with stimulus-specific factors, as suggested, and supports the ‘Assertionfirst’ hypothesis about processing presuppositions—there is no requirement
that presuppositions be verified initially, and in the absence of external
factors that bring the content of the presupposition into attentional focus, the
main assertion is evaluated first.
There are a number of ways to see this in the data. First, note that DefFalse < Only#-True (t=3.4, p<.005); since verifying the presupposition of
‘only’ will amount to the task required for the Def-True condition, the
difference in RT suggests this is not the first thing that happens in the
presupposition failure condition. Secondly, both OnlyS-False (t=2.0, p<.2)
and Only#-False (t=1.2, p=.4) take the same amount of time as EveryFalse—assuming these are all universal statements that evaluate to False, it
makes sense that these conditions should look similar, if in fact the universal
component (i.e. the assertion) is being verified first. Finally, Def-True >
OnlyS-False (t=8.5, p<.0001); if the first step were verifying the
presupposition, you’d expect the reverse, since evaluating a true definite
statement would be a substep of the procedure implicated for an ‘Only’
sentence where the presupposition is satisfied.
Going back for a moment to Experiment 1, recall that there was a big
asymmetry between the Every-True and Only-True conditions; we see the
same large RT difference between the analogous two conditions in
Experiment 2 (OnlyS-True > Every-True), and in fact there are similarly big
differences between Every-True and the other two True conditions as well
(Def-True, Only#-True). The difference between the Definites and ‘Every’ is
particularly striking, since both types of sentences essentially say of some
plurality of individuals that each member has some property.
Suppose the Def-True > Every-True difference actually has something
to do with properties of the definite determiner (after all, definites carry
presuppositions of uniqueness/maximality of their own; even if these were
always satisfied in the current stimuli, they could be contributing to overall
processing complexity). In this case we’d still be left with no good
explanation for the other True cases. However, there is another dimension on
which the ‘Every’ conditions differ from the rest: while domain restriction is
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completely trivial for ‘Every’ (e.g. Every kid has a book, where every
individual in the picture is a kid), the other sentence types require that you
distinguish the set of boys from the set of girls in order to be able to do the
task accurately (e.g. Only the girls have books, where the display has both
boys and girls). This means that in all but the ‘Every’ conditions, subjects
have to apply a verification algorithm that is non-uniform, and consequently
more complex.5 Unlike the definite determiner explanation, this would give
us an explanation for why ‘Every’ is faster than all the other conditions. The
goal of Experiment 3 is to find evidence for one of these two hypotheses.

4

Experiment 3: Domain Restriction, Expectations, and
Verification Complexity

In addition to the conditions from Experiment 2, Experiment 3 had an ‘Every
boy/girl’ condition—sentences like ‘Every boy has a book’. If the difference
between the Definites and ‘Every’ in Experiment 2 was due to the definite
determiner, ‘Every boy’ should pattern with ‘Every kid’. On the other hand,
if ‘Every’ was fast relative to the other conditions because only the latter
required non-trivial domain restriction, ‘Every boy’ should have slow RTs
like the Definite and ‘Only’ conditions, and unlike ‘Every kid’.
4.1 Methods
Examples of the 5 sentence types used in Experiment 3 are in Table 3.
Pictures were identical to those used in Experiment 2 (notice that the same
pictures can be used for the ‘Every boy’ and ‘The boys’ conditions).
Sentence type
Every kid

Every kid has a book

Every boy

Every boy has a book

Definite

The boys have books

Only#

Only the boys have books

Only the boys have books
OnlyS
Table 3: Sentence types and examples for Experiment 3
Subjects saw stimuli from one of five lists. With 8 tokens per cell of the

5

Conceivably, given a sentence like ‘Only the girls have books’, apply an
algorithm like ‘If boy(x), then ¬book(x)’.

224

CHRISTINA KIM

experiment, there were a total of 80 experimental trials per session. 32
UCLA undergraduates participated in the experiment.
4.2 Results
Mean reaction times for Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 4. As in
Experiment 2, there were main effects of Sentence type (F1(4,22)=34.5,
p<.0001; F2(4,35)=34.5, p<.0001) and Truth value (F1(1,22)=290.0,
p<.0001; F2(1,35)=290.4, p<.0001), and a Sentence type-Truth value
interaction (F1(4,22)=8.2, p<.0001; F2(4,35)=8.6, p<.0001).

Fig. 4: Experiment 3: Mean RT by condition
True conditions took longer than False conditions across Sentence types
(all adjusted p<.001); as in Experiment 2, the Only#-True condition was
slow relative to both Only#-False (t=8.0, p<.0001) and OnlyS-False (t=6.1,
p<.0001), and did not differ from OnlyS-True (t=1.7, p<.1). For the ‘Every
boy’ conditions, True sentences pattern with Def-True sentences (t=1.2,
p<.25), and took longer than ‘Every kid’ (t=10.2, p<.0001).
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4.3 Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2, supporting the idea that
presuppositions are not explicitly verified as a first step to interpreting a
sentence given some context.
The fact that ‘Every boy’ behaved like ‘The boys’ and unlike ‘Every
kid’ suggests that the difference observed in Experiment 2 between Definites
and ‘Every’ was not due to properties of the definite determiner, but rather a
difference in the complexity of the verification algorithm required. The
current results show that the conditions that take a long time to respond to
are the ones that require subjects to distinguish among sets of individuals in
the display (boys vs. girls). In contrast, the ‘Every kid’ cases allowed
subjects to take a shortcut: even though there is domain restriction in
sentences like ‘Every kid has a book’, it is completely trivial since every
individual in the display was a kid. Notice that it’s not as simple as the fact
that ‘boys’ and ‘girls’ are both necessarily ‘kids’—if the types of individuals
that could appear in the trials happened to include, for instance, dogs and
cats, we would expect the ‘Every kid’/’Every boy’ asymmetry to disappear.
The ‘shortcut’ effect we’re seeing, then, has to do with subjects’
expectations about what they will see from trial to trial: thus, even though
the pictures provided in the experiment are the evaluation contexts for
sentences in individual trials, one might think of there being a kind of
‘meta’-context which reflects the set of expectations a subject develops over
the set of experimental trials about what is/isn’t possible in any given trial.

5 Conclusions
The three sentence-picture verification experiments presented here
demonstrate, first, that information conveyed by presuppositions and
assertions are used differently in sentence comprehension—they have
different behavioral reflexes, as seen in Experiments 2 and 3. Further, the
data support a view of processing sentence meaning in which there is no
separate process that verifies that presuppositions are satisfied in the context.
By virtue of being backgrounded or ‘noncontroversial’ material,
presuppositions are taken for granted unless some contextually salient piece
of information indicates otherwise. A consequence is that ‘presupposition
failure’ arises only as a byproduct of verifying the assertive content of a
sentence (as in Experiments 2 and 3), or if the presupposed material is
otherwise made extra salient (e.g. visually, or due to recency of mention in
the discourse, as in Experiment 1). In addition, Experiment 3 illustrates that
the complexity of sentence verification procedures is modulated by a
comprehender’s expectations, based on previous trials, of what should and
shouldn’t be a possible stimulus item (e.g. in the current experiments:
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pictures with girls and boys holding different types of items are possible;
pictures with cats and birds, or pictures involving color, are not possible).
More generally, the results reported here suggest that the actual procedure
involved in verifying or falsifying a sentence in some context is never
determined solely by the sentence’s lexical content or syntactic structure—
sentence-external things like factors influencing discourse saliency, and
(possibly changing) expectations based on experience with respect to some
context, affect verification procedures by changing aspects of mental
discourse representations.
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